(1995) 'How to Cope with Noise in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39(1), March, pp. 183-189. [*0]+ Young, H. Peyton (1991) 'The Evolution of Conventions', Working Paper 91-10-043, Economics Research Program, Santa Fe Institute, New Mexico, fourth draft, June.
+ Young, H. Peyton (1992) 'An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining', Working Paper 92-02-009, Economics Research Program, Santa Fe Institute, New Mexico, November 1989 revised September 1991.
* Young, H. Peyton (1993) 'The Evolution of Conventions', Econometrica, 61(1), January, pp. 57-84. [Games are played recurrently and individuals have information about the past play of the game, based on which they form beliefs about how their opponents will play and choose a best response to these beliefs. The chosen actions add to the history of play.] [JSTOR] [young_91.pdf] [*0]
Young, H. Peyton and Foster, Dean (1991) 'Cooperation in the Short and in the Long Run', Games and Economic Behavior, 3(xx), xx, pp. 145-156. [
* Young, H. Peyton (2001) Individual Strategy and Social Strategy: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). [@0.00] [*0]
Zagere, F. C. (1984) Game Theory, Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences Volume 41 (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications). [*0]
